Outcome 2025: Strategic Rebalancing of the West

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Wednesday, December 31, 2025

    Looking back, 2025 is likely to be remembered less as a year of dramatic rupture than as a moment of strategic clarification. Long-standing tensions between the United States and Europe (over burden-sharing, threat perception, and global priorities) have moved from elite debate into the political mainstream. The result is not the collapse of the transatlantic relationship, but its visible transformation.

    In the short term, Europe is bearing the greater strain. For decades, European security rested on a relatively predictable American commitment. As U.S. politics become more inward-looking and strategic attention continues to shift toward Asia, European governments face increased uncertainty and heightened responsibility. Defence budgets are rising, security legislation is being fast-tracked, and political leaders are openly acknowledging that the post-Cold War era of comfort is over.

    These adjustments are costly, politically sensitive, and unevenly distributed across the continent. Europe is not a single strategic actor: threat perceptions differ markedly between Eastern, Northern, and Southern member states, as do attitudes toward autonomy and reliance on the United States. This internal diversity complicates collective action and reinforces the sense of short-term vulnerability. 

    Yet over the longer term, this moment may strengthen Europe rather than weaken it. Strategic autonomy (often misunderstood as separation from the United States) is better understood as the capacity to act credibly when U.S. support is uncertain or unavailable. In practice, this means deeper defence cooperation, more integrated industrial planning, reduced duplication, and stronger political coordination. None of this is quick or guaranteed, but the direction of travel is now clearer than at any point in recent decades.

    For the United States, the picture is more ambiguous. Washington retains unmatched military capabilities, economic power, and a global alliance network. Europe’s stability still matters deeply to U.S. interests. At the same time, alliances are sustained not only by interests but by trust and predictability. A more transactional approach to partners risks eroding the long-term value of alliances that have historically amplified American influence. The strategic costs of weakened loyalty are rarely immediate; rather, they tend to surface over time, especially in periods of systemic competition.

    Within Europe, the drive toward greater autonomy has been accompanied by a sharp shift in political messaging. Russia is increasingly framed as an imminent and existential threat, a narrative that has helped justify rapid increases in defence spending and sweeping security reforms. Given Russia’s war against Ukraine and its broader record of violating international law, these concerns are not invented.

    However, the nature of the threat matters. A large-scale conventional Russian attack on EU or NATO territory remains unlikely in the mid-term. Russia’s military capacity is constrained, its strategic focus is limited, and NATO’s deterrent effect (though politically strained) still functions. The more realistic challenge lies in the grey zone: cyber operations, disinformation, political interference, energy pressure, and military signalling designed to test cohesion rather than trigger open war.

    This distinction is crucial because fear is a blunt political instrument. While threat-based narratives can mobilise public support quickly, they are difficult to sustain over time. Over-securitising Russia risks producing fatigue, scepticism, or backlash — particularly if citizens experience rising military expenditure without a clear explanation of how it enhances everyday security or aligns with broader social priorities.

    Strategic autonomy cannot be built on alarm alone. It requires public consent grounded in transparency and proportionality. Europeans are more likely to support long-term investment in defence and security when it is framed not as emergency mobilisation against an ever-present enemy, but as part of a wider project: protecting democratic institutions, economic stability, social cohesion, and Europe’s capacity to act responsibly on the global stage.

    The deeper lesson of 2025 is therefore not that the West is fragmenting, but that it is recalibrating. Europe faces a choice between reactive militarisation driven by fear and deliberate capacity-building anchored in political legitimacy. The outcome will depend less on how much is spent, and more on how convincingly Europe explains to its citizens what kind of power it seeks to become — and why that power ultimately serves their interests.

    If handled carefully, the current moment of uncertainty could mark the beginning of a more autonomous, resilient, and strategically mature Europe. If mishandled, it risks trading short-term urgency for long-term fragility.


Kamal Makili-Aliyev

Doctor of Laws

31.12.2025

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New article: Revisiting Sweden’s Approach to Human Rights in Foreign Policy

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Tuesday, July 15, 2025

 



My article has been published in the Studies of European Affairs journal. It is called "Revisiting Sweden’s Approach to Human Rights in Foreign Policy." The article looks back at Sweden's human rights approach in its foreign policy and reevaluates its performance since 2009 Alison Brysk's assessment. It is now open access and can be downloaded here.

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Comment to the article "Why Armenia is Not Referring the Situation to the ICC"

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Friday, January 31, 2025

 


The article addresses a significant and thought-provoking topic. However, it is written predominantly from an Armenian perspective, which frames Armenia as the victim in this context. This approach, while offering insight, overlooks the broader geopolitical and historical dimensions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that are essential for a balanced analysis. As such, the article raises several points of contention:

1. Political Context: Armenia’s current situation is rooted in its unlawful occupation of internationally recognized Azerbaijani territories from the early 1990s until late 2020. Presently, Azerbaijan does not occupy any Armenian territory. Instead, the ongoing border disputes stem from Azerbaijan’s armed forces reclaiming their internationally recognized territories and reaching an approximate, yet previously undelimited, border with Armenia. The lack of delimitation arose from Armenia’s prior refusal to recognize the former Soviet administrative boundary as legitimate, compounded by its occupation of territories beyond that border. These disputes are now subject to an ongoing delimitation process.

2. Legal Considerations: Cases potentially under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are already being investigated and prosecuted by Armenia, which has demonstrated its willingness and ability to address these matters. Given the ICC’s principle of complementarity, its jurisdiction in this context is highly questionable. This legal limitation, rather than political pressure, explains Armenia’s decision not to proceed further. Political constraints did not prevent Armenia from initiating a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Furthermore, it is worth noting that Azerbaijan has prosecuted its own citizens for violations of humanitarian law during the 2020 conflict and has called on Armenia to do the same. However, Armenia has consistently refused to prosecute its own nationals, suggesting a mutual reluctance to address these legal violations comprehensively.

3. Factual Accuracy: The claim of forced deportation of Karabakh Armenians does not withstand close scrutiny. During the conflict in September 2023, there was a week-long period following the cessation of hostilities when no civilians or military personnel were harmed, and fighting had ceased entirely. During this time, the Armenian population’s evacuation to Armenia was organized in a highly coordinated manner by the Armenian separatist authorities, who remained in charge at the time. Azerbaijani armed forces had targeted only the separatists’ military infrastructure and refrained from entering heavily populated areas. There is no evidence of threats, coercion, or ultimatums issued by Azerbaijani authorities to compel Armenian civilians to leave. On the contrary, Azerbaijani authorities documented those leaving through the border checkpoint and declared that individuals were welcome to return under Azerbaijan’s legal framework. A dedicated website was even created to facilitate registration for return and provide proper documentation. Therefore, the assertion of forced deportations lacks substantial evidentiary support.

These are just some points to consider in connection to this topic. That said, I want to thank the author for a very interesting article about a conflict that is understudied in the literature.

Kamal Makili-Aliyev

Doctor of Laws

23.01.2025

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